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It is often assumed that recent success in the high-technology
software industry will lead India￿ s development. However, evidence
suggest that basic manufacturing industry is stagnant. This paper
proposes a mechanism that ties these two trends together. A big-push
type of model, featuring linkages between ￿rms, demand spill-over,
and technology choice is elaborated. By imposing di⁄erent cost struc-
tures on the manufacturing and high-technology industries the model
describes outcome in terms of distribution between sectors. It is found
that a policy which promotes a high-technology sector can have nega-
tive e⁄ects on the manufacturing industry as well as aggregate income.
Directing resources towards infrastructure, on the other hand, bene-
￿ts all sectors and increases aggregate income. The results from the
model are found to correspond with the recent development pattern
in India.
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11 Introduction
This study explores economic growth due to spill-overs between sectors in
light of the empirical regularity that has become known as the stages of
development. According to this regularity a country passes through three
distinct stages on its way to becoming developed. In the transition from the
￿rst to the second stage the agricultural sector￿ s share of aggregate income
decreases while the manufacturing share increases. The transition from the
second to the third stage entails a decline in the share of manufacturing in
aggregate income and an expanding service sector.
The vast majority of countries that have a successful record of devel-
opment have followed this pattern. Our study focuses on a country which
stands on the brink of commencing an overarching economic development.
At the beginning of the 21st century India became one of the fastest grow-
ing economies in the world. In accordance with the general pattern out-
lined above, the share of agriculture decreased. However, this was due to
an expanding service sector rather than an expanding manufacturing sec-
tor. Moreover, a substantial part of the growth in services emanates from a
fast growing high-technology information industry which is modern even by
western standards.
In this sense, it seems as if India is skipping a whole stage of development.
Is it possible for a country to successfully sidestep the general pattern of
development stages? We analyze this question by asking to what extent
the success in the service sector can lead an economy-wide progress that
includes the manufacturing industries. A number of circumstances seem to
point in favour of such spill-over e⁄ects. Pro￿ts and wage incomes from
successful ￿rms create a demand for other products. Advances in technology
and production methods could be used to make manufacturing processes
more e¢ cient. Moreover, leading high-tech ￿rms show success stories and
provide role-models for others to follow.
Our intention is not to deny the validity of the above mentioned mech-
anisms. However, we believe that there are other factors that may dampen
these e⁄ects. The reasons for these doubts are that, from a perspective of
development stages, what happens at one stage gears the economy towards
further development. The transition from an agricultural to a manufacturing
economy creates a demand for investment in basic infrastructure such as rail-
ways, roads, harbors and communication systems. But it is likely that service
industries, and especially high-technology industries, do not have the same
needs. In this respect, a success in the service industry does not necessarily
facilitate growth in manufacturing. Another case in point is the education
system where an expansion of the ￿rst and second tier can be viewed as a
2response to the demands of an manufacturing industry. However, a high-
technology sector primarily demands labor with tertiary education. For a
country such as India, where the ￿rst and second tiers of education are badly
in need of more resources, this creates a problem which also encompasses
the prospects of manufacturing industries. Another argument concerns the
consequences of service industries acting as subcontractors to manufacturing
industries. If the service industry does not have a corresponding demand for
manufacturing products, positive e⁄ects on manufacturing due to demand
spill-over will be weaker. All these factors point to the possibility that the
success of the information technology industry comes at the expense of other
sectors, or at least that bene￿cial spill-over e⁄ects are less pronounced.
The aim of this paper is ￿rst to map out the situation in India and to
frame the problem in a suitable theoretical approach. Second, we elaborate
a model to describe what we believe to be a central mechanism in this de-
velopment. In some simple policy experiments we try to demonstrate that
a policy directed at promoting a high technology service sector has negative
growth implications. However, in this static setting we also ￿nd that there
is an optimal level of government involvement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the recent de-
velopment of the Indian economy with regards to manufacturing and high
technology services. In section 3 we frame our problem and discuss related
research. Section 4 develops and solves the model. In section 5 and 6 the
results are discussed and put in context. Section 7 concludes.
2 India￿ s growth experience
From 1960 to 2003 India￿ s growth in real per capita GDP was stagnant at
about 2.5 percent per annum, giving rise to ideas about a Hindu-rate of
growth. After the reforms of 1991 the average growth rate (up to 2003) was
above 3.5 percent increase in per capita GDP. The trend in recent years has
been an accelerating growth at 6 percent or higher.1
Over the long period real output from both manufacturing and services
has increased, the former with a factor 6 and the latter with a factor 8,
suggesting a service led growth. However, the wide aggregate of services
hides a very diverse set of activities.2 From here on we will focus on the high-
1The growth rate in per capita GDP for 2005 was 7.75 according to ￿gures from World
Development Indicators.
2Services has for a long time had an unproportional share in India￿ s industrial struc-
ture (Hansda, 2002). The implications of this have been debated since independence.
We maintain that the implications of high-technology services growth can be analyzed
3technology segment of the service industry. This is the type of production
which ￿ts best into the development-stage framework since it bears evidence
on India￿ s move into the third stage.
2.1 High-technology service industries
The recent boom in the Indian information technology (IT) industry has
spurred hopes that the stagnant growth pattern can be broken (e.g. Srini-
vasan, 2004). In their study of the ￿ revolution￿in services Gordon and Gupta
(2004) put business services, a category which includes IT, at the top of their
list of fast growing service sectors. According to NASSCOM, the Indian Na-
tional Association of Software and Service Companies, information technol-
ogy and information technology enabled services increased their share of GDP
from 1.9 percent in 1999/2000 to a projected share of 4.8 percent in 2006.3
Although activities are increasingly geared towards more advanced services,
it should be noted that a large portion of the ￿rms are still call-centers,
back-o¢ ces and the like. However, what is important for our purposes is the
fact that in a developing country such as India a modern, high-technological
industry plays an increasingly important role.
An educational system that favors higher education, and a resulting large
reserve of scientists and engineers, stands out among the proposed expla-
nations for India￿ s success in the IT industry (Arora and Athreye, 2002).
Other reasons commonly mentioned are facilitating policies from the govern-
ment, preferential labor market and import/export regulation and foreign
connections in the form of a large diaspora (see Kapur, 2002, for a typi-
cal exposition). Considering India￿ s poor infrastructure, it is also important
that the physical infrastructure needed for IT is more easily clustered. The
establishment of Software Technology Parks, where ￿rms are provided with
communication facilities, spread all over India, is evidence of government
involvement and of the feasibility of clustering.
2.2 Manufacturing
Kochhar et al. (2006) document disappointing tendencies in the development
of Indian manufacturing. The manufacturing sector, with the exception of
some industries demanding high-skilled labor, is lagging behind the recent
growth trend. In view of India￿ s enormous pool of low-skilled labor, this is a
puzzling fact. Figure 1 gives an illustration of this disappointing growth in
independently of this historical fact.
3Factsheets published on http://www.nasscom.in/
4Indian manufacturing. The solid line shows a 5-year moving average of the
growth rate in Indian manufacturing, the dotted line shows the corresponding
per capita values. A crude sketch of the post independence (1947) Indian
history can be made by a three-fold division (Kaushik, 1997). First there was
an initial push towards industrialization following independence, during the
rule of Jawaharlal Nehru.4 Then, quasi-socialist policies became a burden,
and the overly controlled economy was stagnant up until the decade before
the famous reforms of 1991.5 In the 1980s industrialization gained momentum
and there were several years of sustained high growth. But, as can be seen
from ￿gure 1, India has not managed to maintain this high level of growth.
Figure 1: Growth in India￿ s Manufacturing Output
3 Framing the problem
Our hypothesis is that the developments in the high-tech sector and the man-
ufacturing sector are causally related. In one sense, this is trivially true. As
we have seen, government policies have favored the growth of a high-tech ser-
vice sector both through long term policies regarding education and recently
also through more directed policy measures. But why did this success not
4For a discussion of the so called Mahalanobis plan see Nurkse (1957).
5The fact that growth started to accelerate years before the reforms were enacted is
analyzed in Rodrik and Subramanian (2004).
5spill over to the manufacturing sector? Why has an increased economic activ-
ity not generated growth in the low-end manufacturing sectors? Here, India
with its vast pool of unskilled labor appears to have an obvious comparative
advantage.
Our argument is not that there is something worrying about the strong
development of high-technology services per se. However, there are plausible
causal mechanisms that tie this positive development to the less convincing
performance of the manufacturing sector.6;7
1. It is commonly recognized that investment in infrastructure is badly
needed in India (Tonkin et al. 2006). There are several reasons why
it is easier for a high-technology service ￿rm than for a manufacturing
￿rm to handle these shortcomings. First of all, investment in telecom-
munications and fast speed computer communication are less costly
than hard infrastructure such as roads and railways (Kapur, 2002). As
for electricity supply, special regulation allowed information technology
industries to build their own generating capacity (Arora and Athreye,
2002). Secondly, the infrastructure required for production of services
can more easily be clustered thereby lowering ￿xed costs. In view of
the success of the service industry there is a risk that resources are
channelled away from the kind of infrastructure that would further the
development of a manufacturing industry. The argument here is that
the success of the service industry tends to reduce political pressure
for overall infrastructural investments, or at least channel it in other
directions.
2. Reforms of education are not being undertaken. One of the prime
explanations for India￿ s success in information technology is the great
reserve of quali￿ed engineers. It is a well known fact that India has
always had a relatively well endowed and well functioning educational
system at the tertiary level. However, it is also well known that this has
come at the expense of primary and (especially) secondary education
6Some researchers, e.g. Gordon and Gupta (2004), tend to interpret the data di⁄erently.
They see the current stagnation in industry and the fast growing service sector as evidence
that India has reached the third stage of development. However, considering that India￿ s
per capita GDP is about 2 percent of OECD average, we argue that it can hardly be
maintained that India has reached an industrialized stage of development. In this regard,
it can also be mentioned that in 1995 agriculture employed about 2/3 of the workforce.
7The notion that underdeveloped economies might skip technological steps taken by
previously industrialized economies has been given the label "leapfrogging" in the liter-
ature. The prototypical example is when a country goes from having no telephones into
using mobile phones (Stough et al. 2005).
6(Rao et al., 2003).8 An increased demand for higher education from
service sectors could potentially cement this malignant pattern.9 The
argument here is that the poor quality of the primary and secondary
schools hurt manufacturing the most by lowering the productivity of
the workforce in that sector (Bosworth and Collins, 2007).
3. There are fewer and less strong backward linkages from service sectors
to manufacturing sectors than in the other direction. This means that
service industries have less need to buy intermediate inputs from other
industries (outside the service sector) than manufacturing industries.
The linkages in the Indian economy have been studied by Banga and
Goldar (2005) and Hansda (2002). Although they ￿nd evidence of
linkages in both directions, Hansda stresses that backward linkages
from the service sector are weaker than the forward linkages (sales
to other sectors). If the service sector is not generating a demand
elsewhere in the economy then it will not increase market potential of
manufacturing goods.
A predominant idea in the structuralist framework, which we will sub-
scribe to in this study, is that what happens at one stage of development can
be said to prepare, or lay the foundation for, subsequent development. At
an abstract level, this is the essence of the problems above.10 For instance,
during the development phase where manufacturing expands, physical in-
frastructure is built up, partly as a response to demand from producers.
Export demand is an obvious explanation for the emergence and much
of the subsequent growth in the IT sector, which we disregard from in our
model. Based on demand for exports it could still be argued that the high
tech service sector will continue to develop independently of manufacturing.
In this regard, it is our contention that such pattern is highly unlikely to
8One indication of this pattern comes from literacy rates. Bosworth and Collins (2007)
report literacy rates (ages 15-24) of 76 percent in India compared to 99 percent in China.
9Some studies have indicated that primary and secondary schooling are more important
propellants of growth than higher education (Self, 2004). Other ￿nd that secondary educa-
tion is the key education variable in explaining growth convergence between Indian states
(Trivedi, 2002). However, in general there is little consensus regarding the relationship
between education and growth (Temple, 2001).
10The explanation for the poor performance in manufacturing proposed by Kochar et al.
(2006) is that increases in labor cost are spilling over to manufacturing industry. Although
intensive in low-skilled labor lower end manufacturing also has a need to employ more qual-
i￿ed sta⁄ such as managers, administrative personnel and production engineers. Hence,
increased wage cost for high-skilled labor also hurt the competetiveness of manufacturing.
This a price-e⁄ect that we will abstract from in our analysis.
7sustain growth in the long run. In a country the size of India￿ s, domestic
demand is arguably crucial.11
It is instructing to compare India with South Korea, which is one of the
prime examples of successful export led growth (Westpahl, 1990). Korean
industrial policy in the 1960s primarily focused on facilitating growth of
internationally competitive export industries. A wide array of policies, from
tax exemption to direct intervention, was implemented. Importantly, the
protection also comprised domestic production of intermediaries used in the
production of export goods. Similarly to India, external demand was a key
in Korea￿ s accelerated growth. What separates the two cases is the way that
this demand spilled over into other sectors. In this respect it is arguably
critical that Korea managed to secure complete production chains.
Another problem in our study is how growth in manufacturing can be
achieved. It is our contention that manufacturing is not su⁄ering from ab-
sence of comparative advantage in relation to the high tech sector. A more
appropriate view is that of a bottleneck problem involving high ￿xed costs.
Our model captures these costs in terms of underdeveloped infrastructure.
However, equally important explanations can arguably be found in the labor
regulations, high import and export tari⁄and other institutional constraints
that remains even after the deregulation wave starting in 1991 (Kohli, 2006;
Ahluwalia, 2002). Our model abstracts from di⁄erential e⁄ects due to regu-
lation on growth in manufacturing and high-tech services.
3.1 Related Research
Three distinct strands of theory dealing with the industrialization process can
be discerned. The most recent is the new economic geography/trade theory.
Monopolistic competition models with transport costs are used to show that
once a certain critical mass, in the form of either technological or pecuniary
externalities, has been reached an agglomeration process starts (Krugman,
1981; Krugman and Venables, 1995; Markusen, 1989). In a multilateral
trade setting, countries can di⁄er with respect to stage of development due
to varying transport costs (Baldwin et al., 2001).12
Second, in the traditional neoclassical capital accumulation theory, the
key components are capital and technology. A country develops through
accumulation of physical and human capital. Due to diminishing marginal
productivity of capital, growth eventually comes to a halt where only tech-
nological progress can generate further growth (Solow, 1956). Later research
11A similar argument is presented by Wu (2007).
12A recent study is McLaren (2000) who shows that industrial structure is closely linked
to the openness of an economy.
8has integrated technological choice to show the possibility of di⁄erent levels
of industrialization (e.g. Parente and Prescott, 1994; Zilibotti, 1995).13
The third strand of theory, which we believe to be most relevant to
our problem, is the structuralist branch (Chenery, 1975). An early study
is Kuznets (1957), who concluded that the long term trends in the industrial
structure of a growing economy were remarkably similar to the cross section
di⁄erences between countries with di⁄erent per capita income. It is now com-
mon practice to associate the stages of development with the sectoral divide
between agriculture, manufacturing and services (Rostow, 1971).
Kuznet￿ s conclusion was that economic development is associated with an
increase in the share of manufacturing and a decline in the share of agricul-
ture. However, the development of the service sector was considered less clear
cut (see Chenery, 1960). A more modern account of development stages in-
cludes a step where manufacturing stagnates and services grow (Kongsamut,
et al., 2001).
Another common ingredient of the structuralist tradition is the empha-
sis on linkages between sectors (Hirschman, 1958) and chains of input and
demand spill-over (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). The modern and formal inter-
pretation of these arguments is ￿ Increasing returns￿or ￿ Big Push￿models.14
The study by Murphy et al. (1989) has been in￿ uential for the rather small
literature that combines increasing returns with linkages between di⁄erent
producers. The basic idea is that ￿rms can choose to implement an increas-
ing returns technology. Fixed cost associated with this mode of production
is prohibitively expensive for the individual ￿rm. Murphy et al. (1989)
demonstrated that an adoption of the new technology was possible only by
coordinating the implementation across many sectors. The demand spill-over
due to higher total output then helps more ￿rms to overcome the ￿xed cost.
Fafchamps and Helms (1996) analyze vertical linkages between intermedi-
ate inputs. They show that intermediate input demand combined with a high
income elasticity for industrial goods can generate multiple equilibria. In a
similar framework, Gans (1997; 1998a,b) discusses the ￿xed cost assumption.
Fixed costs can enter either as overhead labor cost or as a deduction from
output. Gans (1997) shows that the choice of speci￿cation is not crucial for
generating multiple equilibria. The most recent contribution to this litera-
ture is Ciccone (2002). His model features horizontal intermediate demand
13For instance Rioja (1999) and Esfhani and Ram￿rez (2003) incorporate infrastruc-
ture as a public good to demonstrate the existence of an optimal level of infrastructural
investment.
14Describing industrialization speci￿cally as adoption of increasing returns to scale pro-
duction has been an in￿ uential idea (e.g. Young, 1928; for a survey see Matsuyama,
1995)
9linkages between industrial ￿rms. From a technical point of view this is also
our main source of inspiration.
In the next section, we build a model using the structuralist framework
as developed by Ciccone (2002). Central to our analysis is how ￿rms adopt
di⁄erent kinds of technologies, and how this is a⁄ected by interconnections
between sectors. To make the analysis tractable we simplify other aspects of
the economic environment. The most stark contrast to neoclassical models
is that we will reduce the role of the price mechanism.
4 A model of industrialization
4.1 Outline of the model
The model has three sectors, denoted A(griculture), M(anufacturing) and
H(igh technology). We will refer to M and H collectively as industrial sec-
tors. Firms in these sectors are characterized by monopolistic competition,
increasing returns to scale and the use of intermediates. A ￿rms, also re-
ferred to as pre-industrial ￿rms, have a constant returns to scale technology
and use only labor as input.
We set up the model in three steps. First we follow Ciccone (2002) closely
and build a model with only the two sectors A and M. We do this to show
that it is possible to construct an equilibrium where some but not all ￿rms
have industrialized. In a second step, we allow di⁄erent industrial technolo-
gies, i.e. we add the H sector. Finally, we introduce a government in order
to study the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies.
Goods and ￿rms are de￿ned on a segment of the real line. Hence, there
is a continuum of goods, each indexed by the real number m 2 [0;1]. If
m0 < m00, we say that m0 is upstream of m00.
The ￿rst model generates an outcome where the n ￿rms furthest upstream
industrialize, i.e. are M ￿rms. The other 1 ￿ n remain in the pre-industrial
stage, i.e. are A ￿rms (￿gure 2). An industrial ￿rm buys input from each
industrial ￿rm upstream (￿rm m0 ￿ n buys from all m < m0).




, the M sector on the interval (nH;nM], and the A sector
on (nM;1] (￿gure 3). Again, an industrial ￿rm uses input from all other ￿rms
upstream of its own position, i.e. M ￿rms buy from both M and H ￿rms,
whereas H ￿rms only buy from other H ￿rms.
10Figure 2: Structure with one industrial sector
Figure 3: Structure with two industrial sectors
4.2 Basics
There is a measure L of households. The utility function of the representative





Where c(m) is consumption of good m. Preferences over consumption goods
are symmetric and the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent goods is
unity. Assuming identical prices, households consume an identical amount
of each good. On the supply side, each household inelastically supplies one
unit of labor. Labor is the only resource and wages the only compensation
to production factors. Apart from wages, households get additional income
from ￿rm￿ s pro￿t. Firms in the A sector produce one unit of output using
one unit of labor. Hence, marginal cost of production is equal to wage. A
￿rms are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The industrial ￿rm indexed m (either M or H) assembles a composite
z(m) of other industrial goods. In a second step, this composite is used
together with labor to produce an intermediate good x(m).






lnx(m) = lnB + ￿ lnz(m) + (1 ￿ ￿)lnl(m) (2)
The aggregation function (6) is designed to have constant returns in x
and to increase in m.15 The production function (2), has a standard Cobb-
Douglas form. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) determines the relative factor shares
of z(m) and l(m), and will be referred to as intermediate intensity input in
industrial ￿rms. The constant B is set so as to normalize the marginal
product.16 As a consequence, all ￿rms have the same marginal cost. Set
wage as numeraire (w = 1), to get unit marginal cost for all ￿rms.




x(m) ￿ f (m): (3)
Where ￿ 2 (0;1) is an technology e¢ ciency parameter. The function f(m)
is a ￿xed cost, which is assumed to be increasing, f0(m) > 0. We use a ￿rst
degree polynomial to describe this cost.17 In the ￿rst model, with only M as
industrial ￿rms, the constant terms is omitted, and we have f(m) = ￿m.
Industrialization is described as a process in which A ￿rms are replaced
by M ￿rms. This has two main e⁄ects. First, production is carried out
more e¢ ciently, due to the parameter ￿. Second, the structure of production
changes, as ￿rms are linked together by intermediate input usage. The den-
sity of these interconnections is governed by the parameter ￿. For each good,
the criterion for adopting the industrial technology by changing from A to M
will ultimately depend on the demand for a ￿rm￿ s output, its ￿xed costs and
the e¢ ciency parameter ￿. Since ￿xed costs are increasing in m, the further
15Dividing the integral by m ensures that we have CRS. And adding the logarithm of
m yields a log-linear increase of z(m) in m: If identical amounts (x￿) of each intermediate
is used we have z(m) = mx￿.
16Equal marginal products of z(m) and l(m) gives z(m) =
￿
1￿￿l(m). Substitute this




















. Substitute l(m) for x(m) to get Cost =
x(m)
B￿￿(1￿￿)1￿￿. Now we can set
B so as to get a denominator equal to 1. This implies unit marginal and average cost of
x(m).
17Ciccone (2002) assumed constant ￿xed costs. Given this formulation once the ￿rst
￿rm industrialized all others will follow. This follows from an increasing demand when
more ￿rms industrialize.
12downstream the higher the cost of adopting the industrial technology. The
rationale for this assumption, which will be discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 5.1, is that coordination costs are higher when more intermediates must
be shipped from di⁄erent suppliers. The parameter ￿ will be interpreted as
a cost which is dependent on the quality of infrastructure.
4.3 Pro￿t and Demand
The perfectly competitive A ￿rms set price equal to 1. We add the assump-
tion that the markup of an industrial good has an upper cap. Each good can
potentially be produced by A, M or H ￿rms. If a monopolistic M or H ￿rm
sets its price above 1, it is assumed that an A ￿rm enters and undercuts this
price. Hence, the A ￿rms constitutes a competitive fringe.
Technology and preferences imply that industrial ￿rms face unit elasticity
of demand from consumers and intermediate input buyers. Hence, industrial
￿rms maximize pro￿t by setting as high price as possible, and thereby reach
the upper price bound. Consequently, the price of labor, intermediate input
and consumption goods from all types of ￿rms is equal to one (p = 1).
Given these prices, we can use ￿nal output (3) to write the pro￿t function
of industrial ￿rms as
￿(m) = yO(m) ￿ x(m) = (1 ￿ ￿)yO(m) ￿ ￿f(m): (4)
Let yD(m;n) denote the total demand for good m when n ￿rms have
industrialized. Since monopolistic industrial ￿rms make pro￿t on each unit
sold, it will always meet demand, yO(m) = yD(m;n).
Demand has two components, demand for consumption and intermediate
input. Given that prices are identical, only demand for intermediate input
will di⁄er between goods. Denote consumption demand, given that n ￿rms
have industrialized D(n). Demand for good m as an intermediate input can
be written as the sum of demand from all industrial ￿rms downstream of
m: The total demand for input for an industrial ￿rm is ￿[yO(m) + f(m)],
from ￿nal output (3). A fraction ￿ of this is intermediate input. Moreover,
the ￿rm indexed m supplies intermediate input to a natural number m ￿rms
downstream.18 Hence, a ￿rm supplies 1=m of its total intermediate supply
to each downstream industrial ￿rm. Given this, the demand for good m as






￿(yD(i;n) + f(i))di + D(n): (5)
18Technically, n and m are measures, this causes conceptual problems which we ignore.
For details we refer to Ciccone (2002).
13Consumers spend all their income on consumer goods, therefore D(n)
must be related to aggregate income, which we denote by Y (n). Given iden-
tical prices, and a unit elasticity of substitution, households will buy identical
number of all goods. Therefore D(n) = Y (n).

















The two parts within square brackets is the demand for m to cover ￿xed
costs upstream.19 Although ￿rms incur a reduction in demand to cover its
own ￿xed costs, demand is increasing in ￿;20 holding the level of industrial-
ization constant. However, raising the ￿xed costs will move the frontier of
industrialization upstream since fewer ￿rms will now industrialize. This will
cause demand for goods upstream as intermediates to decrease, and aggregate
pro￿ts and income to fall.
Aggregate income is the sum of two components, labor income and prof-
its from industrial ￿rms. Due to inelastic labor supply and since the wage
equal to 1, the former is equal to the exogenous L. We denote pro￿ts from
industrialized ￿rms by ￿. From pro￿t (4) and demand (6), the expression




((1 ￿ ￿)yD(m;n) ￿ ￿f(m))dm: (7)
Given the identity Y (n) = L+￿, demand (6) and aggregate pro￿t (7) we















< 1. Note that we can divide by L to get a per
capita expression. Aggregate income, and pro￿ts are all increasing in ￿ and
decreasing in ￿.21 If the intensity of intermediate input use or the e¢ ciency
increases (￿ decreases), demand and pro￿ts will respond positively.







When solved with initial condition ^ x(n) = ￿n this yields the expression within the square













and since n > m this is allways > 0.
21This can be ver￿ed using the fact that @￿
@￿ < 0 and @￿
@￿ > 0:
144.4 Equilibrium with two sectors
When analyzing the equilibrium, we use the concept of local stability.22 An
interior point n 2 (0;1), will constitute an equilibrium if ￿rms upstream of n
make a pro￿t using industrial technology, whereas ￿rms downstream would
incur a loss.23 We are only interested in cases where some, but not all ￿rms
have undergone industrialization. This restriction follows from our ambition
to construct a model which allows us to analyze changes in sector shares due
to policy interventions; positive changes in these shares would of course be
impossible if all ￿rms had industrialized to begin with.
Production of the marginal good, n, must generate the same pro￿t whether
produced by an A or an M ￿rm.24 Since A ￿rms are perfectly competitive
and make zero pro￿t, the same must be true for an M ￿rms. By the pro￿t





We solve for the relationship between ￿xed cost parameter ￿ as a function
of n. In condition (9), note that y(n;n) = Y (n), and then substitute for Y (n)




n2 [￿￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿] + 2n￿
Note that
@￿(n)
@n < 0, i.e. the requisite ￿xed cost parameter decreases when
we allow industrialization to progress further. Since ￿(n) is decreasing in n
we can get a lower bound for the ￿xed cost parameter by setting n = 1. For
some parameters ￿ and ￿ we can pick a ￿￿ (￿;￿;L;n) such that n < 1. Then
our conditions are met and we have a stable equilibrium in point n. This
demonstrates that a partial industrialization outcome can be a locally stable
equilibrium.
22For an rigorous analysis we refer to Ciccone (2002) and Krugman (1991).
23We here depart from Ciccone (2002), who analyzes three possible cases, pre-, full- and
partial- industrial equilibrium. Since two former pertain to the big-push argument they
have no relevance for our purposes.
24It is here assumed that a presumptive M ￿rm does not internalize the e⁄ect of an
expansion in demand due to his entry. There is a possibility that
d￿(n)
dn jn=n￿ = (1 ￿
￿)Y 0(n￿) ￿ ￿￿ > 0, given that we allow Y 0(n￿) 6= 0. It can be shown that this will always
hold as long as ￿ < ￿.
154.5 Introducing choice of technology
We now introduce a new structure, with two types of industrial ￿rms M and
H. These ￿rms di⁄er with respect to technology and ￿xed cost structure.
An industrial ￿rm can produce the ￿nal good using a parameter ￿M which
costs nothing or at a cost c use a more e¢ cient technology ￿H, such that
0 ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿M ￿ 1. Since demand, and hence pro￿t, is declining in m,
the ￿rms furthest upstream will pro￿t the most by using the more e¢ cient
technology. This will generate an outcome where M ￿rms use intermediate
input from both M and H ￿rms, whereas H ￿rms use only goods produced
by other H ￿rms. The H sector will therefore be the interval 0 ￿ m ￿ nH,
and the M sector the interval nH < m ￿ nM.
4.6 Demand and pro￿t functions
Begin with the M sector. As before we can ￿nd the demand for M goods
by solving for yD(m;nM). The demand facing ￿rms in the interval nH <
m ￿ nM is given by two parts. One is the demand from other M ￿rms, and
the other consumption demand. This can be expressed similar as in (5). For






￿M (yD(i;nM) + fM(i))di + Y (nM;nH) (10)
Where fM(m) = ￿m. And the total consumption demand Y (nH;nM)
is now dependent on the size of both the M and the H sector. For the
H ￿rms in the interval 0 ￿ m ￿ nH, demand can again be expressed as
three components. Of these, demand from M ￿rms and consumer can be
summarized in one component which is equal to the demand facing the M
￿rm furthest upstream. This is yD(nH;nM), which can be derived from (10).
The third part is the demand from other H ￿rms, which obviously also must






￿H (yD(i;nH;nM) + fH(i))di + yD(nH;nM): (11)
Where fH(m) = c + ￿m. Given demand in each sector, we can ￿nd the
industrialized ￿rm￿ s pro￿t. Integrating over the two sectors yield aggregate
pro￿ts ￿H and ￿M. Aggregate income will consist of three parts, pro￿ts
from the H and M sectors, income from labor:
Y (nM;nH) = ￿
M + ￿
H + L: (12)
16Generally, aggregate pro￿t can be written as
￿
M + ￿
H = Y (nM;nH)A(￿;￿M;￿H;nH;nM) + ￿B (￿;￿M;￿H;nH;nM):
This can be substituted into aggregate income (12) and solved for Y (nM;nH).
Since A and B are nonlinear functions in most parameters, we only present
numerical solutions.
4.7 Equilibrium with three sectors
The equilibrium of interest is one where the H sector has begun to develop
but still not engulfed the M sector. Put formally this means that nM 2 (0;1)
and nH < nM. As before the M ￿rm furthest downstream, is indi⁄erent to
industrializing. In other words, this ￿rm makes zero pro￿ts, yielding the
condition:
(1 ￿ ￿M)y(nM;nM) ￿ ￿MfM(nM) = 0: (13)
With two industrialized sectors, the M ￿rm furthest upstream, i.e. closest
to the H sector, must be indi⁄erent to switching to the H technology. From
the pro￿t function (4) we get the following condition:
(￿H ￿ ￿M)y(nH;nM) + ￿HfH(nH) ￿ ￿MfM(nM) = 0: (14)
4.8 Policy Experiments
We now introduce a government in order to perform policy experiments. The
government redistributes from aggregate income to either the M or the H
sector. The revenue side of the government is a uniform ￿ at tax on each
households income. The expenditure side is a subsidy which lowers the ￿xed
costs. The magnitude of government involvement is exogenously given.
A ￿rst experiment is to subsidize the cost of using the H technology
￿H. We introduce a subsidy ￿, and each H ￿rm now pays a ￿xed cost
fH;G1(m) = (1 ￿ ￿)c + ￿m. Denote the total cost of this subsidy G. This
gives us two restrictions, which together with condition (13), characterize the
equilibrium:
(￿H ￿ ￿M)y(nH;nM) + ￿HfH;G1(nH) ￿ ￿MfM(nM) = 0: (15)
and
G = ￿cnH:
A second experiment is to subsidize the cost ￿m, which is common to all
industrialized ￿rms. Again the size of the subsidy is given by a share ￿ of
17the ￿xed costs. Hence M ￿rms now have a cost fM;G2(m) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿m, and
H ￿rms fH;G2(m) = c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m. We have the conditions
(1 ￿ ￿M)y(nM;nM) ￿ ￿MfM;G2(m) = 0 (16)
(￿H ￿ ￿M)y(nH;nM) + ￿HfH;G2(nH) ￿ ￿MfM;G2(m) = 0: (17)






5.1 Conceptual issues and Parameter values
The full model has three sectors, which di⁄er with respect to (i) ￿xed costs,
(ii) level of returns to scale, (iii) use of intermediates and (iv) supplies of
intermediate goods to other ￿rms.
The model features two types of ￿xed costs. The ￿rst pertains to the use
of industrial technologies (M or H). These modes of production requires the
use and combination of di⁄erent intermediate inputs. The ￿xed cost captured
by ￿ re￿ ects the cost of coordination, which is increasing in the number of
intermediates used. This provides the conceptual link to infrastructure. It is
plausible that poor infrastructure is more costly as more intermediate goods
have to be shipped geographically across the country and more contacts
are needed between buyers and suppliers. The second cost is the cost of
upgrading the industrial technology. This cost should be thought of mainly as
an investment in human capital and skills needed to adopt the H technology.
Both of these costs are incurred at the ￿rm level in order to make indus-
trial production feasible. Here it is important to underscore that our model
is designed to analyze a development economy, where there are substantial
costs associated with low quality infrastructure and low levels of human cap-
ital. These costs must be covered in order for a production unit to establish.
The empirical task of identifying these costs is by no means straight forward,
but in principle they are observable entities. In solving the model, we will
in practice treat these costs as residuals. The costs are set so as to achieve
the desired distribution of sectors. Given the other parameters, ￿ and c will
determine the size of H and M.
In our model it might seem counterintuitive that H has a higher degree
of returns to scale than M. If the latter represents manufacturing we usu-
ally think of these ￿rms as the prototype for increasing returns ￿especially
18processing of raw materials. However, the ￿rms in our model has no degrees
of freedom in making an output volume decision, but merely responds to a
given demand. This means that a shift from the M to the H technology
should be interpreted as a decision to shift to a more e¢ cient technology
rather than a decision pertaining to scale. Since this is one of the main
driving mechanisms of our model we need the parameters ￿M and ￿H to be
smaller than 1. We choose a moderate value of 0:9 for the M sector and a
multiple 0:9 of this for the H sector.
The magnitude of the linkages is determined by the parameter ￿, which
is set to 0:5. This can be compared to the share of value of intermediate in-
puts in US manufacturing which is approximately 0:67 (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2002). We ￿nd it plausible that a developing country should have
a somewhat lower degree of intermediate usage. Finally, the population size
L is normalized to 1.
5.2 First results
A ￿rst step is to identify an appropriate cost parameter ￿: This is done in
the model with two sectors, A and M. Given the parameter speci￿cation,
a lower bound for the ￿xed cost parameter ￿ is about 0:13, at which full
industrialization is reached. When the ￿xed cost parameter is set equal to
0:4, aggregate income is 1:041 which is 4:1 percent above the baseline case
with no industrialization. The industrialized sector comprises 29 percent
of all goods. The ￿xed cost incurred by ￿rms due to poor infrastructure
is approximately 2 percent of aggregate income. We argue that this is a
conservative estimate.
We now turn to the model with three sectors. The parameter c is added
and set to 0:2. With this parameterization, aggregate income is 1:053 and
29:3 percent of all goods are produced with an industrial technology (M
or H), and 9:9 percent with the H technology. Total ￿xed costs, accruing
both to ￿ and c, are now 0:4. This cost falls almost equally on cost due to
infrastructure (￿) and cost due to higher requirement of human capital (c).
It is our presumption that this is as close to a neutral parameterization as
we can come.
It is interesting to see how sensitive our parameterization of costs is to
changes in the parameters, ￿ and ￿. Table 1 presents results for di⁄erent
values of ￿. For a given cost structure and technology, increasing the density
of linkages a⁄ects the size of the H sector more than the M sector. Moreover,
total income increases signi￿cantly without much change in the number of
goods produced by industrial technologies (M or H). Demand for interme-
diates increases due to more dense linkages, this bene￿ts ￿rms upstream and
19makes it feasible to produce more goods with the H technology. However,
the M ￿rms furthest downstream only bene￿t from increase in aggregate
income due to higher pro￿ts of other ￿rms.
In table 2 the size of e¢ ciency parameters ￿M is varied (keeping ￿H =
0:9￿M). It is evident that the e¢ ciency parameter is the main determinant
of growth in the model. When the e¢ ciency of both M and H technology
improves, this increases the relative size of the H sector. Table 3 shows the
e⁄ect of varying the di⁄erence between and ￿M and ￿H. As the H technology
becomes relatively more e¢ cient, it is possible for more ￿rms to bear the
￿xed costs c.
2 sectors 3 sectors
￿ 0:25 0:5 0:75 0:25 0:5 0:75
Y (n) 1:024 1:041 1:089 1:025 1:053 1:132
nM 0:284 0:289 0:302 0:283 0:292 0:313
nH ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:026 0:099 0:174
Table 1: Sensitivity to variation in density of linkages
2 sectors 3 sectors
￿M 0:80 0:9 0:95 0:80 0:9 0:95
Y (n) 1:240 1:041 1:010 1:298 1:053 1:011
nM 0:775 0:289 0:133 0:814 0:292 0:094
nH ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:532 0:099 0:029
Table 2: Sensitivity to variation in e¢ ciency parameter
3 sectors
￿H
￿M 0:875 0:9 0:95
Y (n) 1:061 1:053 1:026
nM 0:295 0:292 0:151
nH 0:187 0:099 0:009
Table 3: Sensitivity to relative e¢ ciency
5.3 Policy Experiments
Table 4 shows the e⁄ect of introducing a government of a size 0:02. In other
words, the government raises taxes equal to about 2 percent of total income
20and uses these revenues to either subsidize infrastructure or supply of high-
skilled labor. This is a modest size of a government, but bear in mind that
its only role is to subsidize either infrastructure or high skilled labor supply.
The government in the model should not be equated with a complete public
sector. Moreover, the size of government is related to the fact that costs are
also relatively small.
Variables No Policy Policy 1 Policy 2
Y (n) 1:053 1:039 1:072
nM 0:292 0:289 0:498
nH 0:099 0:283 0:176
Table 4: Policy Experiments
The di⁄erence between policy 1 and policy 2 in terms of e⁄ect on aggre-
gate income is striking. Whereas policy 2 increases aggregate output by 1:8
percent, policy 1 actually decreases total income by 1:3 percent. E⁄ects on
positions of sector M and H are as expected, policy 1 promotes the H sector,
but has a negative e⁄ect on the M sector. Policy 2 has positive e⁄ect on the
size of both the M and H sector.
Next, we let government size vary from 0:001 (approximately 0:1 percent
of the total income) to 0:02. Figure 4 plots the resulting paths for the H
and the M sector, and ￿gure 5 plots the development of total income. Policy
1 are associated with solid lines, and policy 2 with dashed lines. The two
upper lines in ￿gure 4 describes the M sector, and the lines below the H
sector. Reducing the cost of skilled labor under policy 1 obviously boosts the
development of an H sector, but as can be seen the e⁄ect on the M sector,
as well as on total industrialization, is negative. Moreover, policy 1 reduces
aggregate output (￿gure 5).
Directing government funds towards improvement of infrastructure, under
policy 2, leads to an increase in both the M and H sector. The M sector
increases faster than the H sector. This is due to the fact that the marginal
M ￿rm bene￿ts more from the subsidy than the marginal H ￿rm. The
subsidy gives little incentive for a marginal ￿rm to change from M to H
technology, since the ￿xed cost m￿ remains almost the same. Nevertheless,
some ￿rms do change since the ￿xed cost is produced more e¢ ciently with
the H technology. The e⁄ect on total income is positive. However, as can be
seen in ￿gure 5, total income increases at a decreasing rate.
Next, we explore two pertinent features of the two policies. First, why is
aggregate income decreasing under policy 1? The second issue relates to the
concavity of aggregate income in government size which suggests that there
21might be an optimal size of government involvement.
Figure 4: Location of M and H Sectors.
The detrimental e⁄ects that policy 1 has on total income at ￿rst seems
strange. Under this policy, government revenues are used to subsidize H
￿rms. The increased pro￿ts are distributed to consumers which should coun-
teract the negative e⁄ect of the tax on consumer demand. However, the sub-
sidy introduces several other distortions which lower aggregate income. We
take policy 1 with a government size equal to 0:02 as an example. Consider
￿rst former M ￿rms which changes to H technology. Due to the use of more
e¢ cient technology, revenues in these ￿rms increase by 80 percent. However,
cost increases by almost 210 percent since ￿rms now also incur the cost c:
The subsidy compensates for part of this increased cost, and allows ￿rms
to increase their pro￿ts by a total of 22 percent. However, from aggregate
perspective, each unit of subsidy directed towards these ￿rms generates only
0:78 units of pro￿ts. The same adverse e⁄ect is found in the ￿rms which used
H technology before the subsidy (and continues to do so), here each unit of
subsidy generates an 0:68 increase in pro￿ts. Demand spillover between these
￿rms falls as the government decreases the cost of using H. The old H sector
is also a⁄ected negatively by the more e¢ cient production downstream, this
decreases demand for upstream goods as intermediates, and reduces pro￿ts
22Figure 5: Total Income
further. Aggregate output is also reduced when overall industrialization (H
and M) is pushed back, this e⁄ect is however small. The e⁄ects are shown in
table 5, where the total negative e⁄ect should be compared to the reduction
in aggregate output in table 4.
Firms E⁄ect on aggregate output
Exiting M < ￿0:00001
From M to H +0:0027
Old H, Subsidy +0:0048
Old H, Downstream demand ￿0:0013
Tax ￿0:0200
Total e⁄ect ￿0:0138
Table 5: E⁄ects of Policy 1
There are two main mechanisms behind these results. First, part of the
subsidy goes to ￿rms with few backwards linkages, which are not able to
generate much demand in the rest of the economy. Second, part of the
subsidy promotes technology upgrading from M to H. This actually has
adverse consequences for ￿rms upstream, since the demand for their products
23decrease. Furthermore, pro￿ts in the ￿rms that change to H do not rise
su¢ ciently to compensate for the new ￿xed cost c that they now incur.
Figure 6: Total Income, Policy 2
In a setting with only the A and the M sector, the e⁄ect of policy 2
is strictly increasing in government size. However, things are di⁄erent in
a model with three sectors. Figure 6 plots the e⁄ect on total income of
varying the government size from 0:001 to 0:08. This is obviously a concave
function which reaches a maximum at a government size of about 0:04. Table
6 summarizes the e⁄ects of two government sizes, one close to and one above
the optimal level.
The ￿rst column shows the index of the ￿rm furthest downstream in
each sector, and the second the change in pro￿ts in each sector, using no
government as benchmark. The ratio presented in the third column gives a
measure of how much pro￿t is generated by each unit of subsidy spent. First
of all, it is evident that pro￿ts in all sectors are increasing compared to the
benchmark. Second, it is the ￿rms furthest upstream that bene￿t the most.
The is an artifact of the increase in demand for intermediate input as more
￿rms downstream industrialize. From an aggregate perspective, subsidies
are bene￿cial except in the sector which consists of new M ￿rms. It is here
that costs related to infrastructure is the highest, and it is consequently into
24Gov=0.036 Gov=0.076
Firms m ￿￿ ￿￿
Subsidy m ￿￿ ￿￿
Subsidy
New M 0:599 0:014 0:51 0:783 0:029 0:44
Old M 0:292 0:008 1:87 0:292 0:002 1:84
From M to H 0:213 0:013 3:66 0:274 0:027 3:36
Old H 0:099 0:023 23:80 0:099 0:033 26:90
Tax ￿0:036 ￿0:076
Total E⁄ect 0:022 0:016
Table 6: E⁄ects of Policy 2
these ￿rms that the lion￿ s share of the subsidies will be directed (76 and
86 percent respectively). These ￿rms can only cover part of the cost due
to infrastructure through own pro￿ts. As more and more M ￿rms enter,
a larger fraction of subsidies must be directed towards covering ￿xed costs.
The increase in demand and pro￿t upstream is eventually not su¢ cient to
compensate for this cost. Moreover, reducing the ￿xed cost (while keeping
the positions constant) actually decreases demand linkage e⁄ects. In addition
to this, ￿rms that shift from M to H will increase their pro￿t, but at the
same time generate less demand upstream. The mechanisms here are similar
to policy 1.
6 Discussion
The model elaborated in previous chapters captures several of the mecha-
nisms discussed in relation to India. The policy experiments can be thought
of as directing government e⁄orts either to facilitate overall industrial ac-
tivities or to promoting the establishment of high-technology ￿rms. This is
another way of capturing the e⁄ect of increasing the quality of infrastructure
(which is assumed to a⁄ect all industrial activities) or to increase the pool
of skilled labor (which is assumed to be used in the high-technology sectors).
The mechanism that drives our result is the linkage e⁄ect between ￿rms. Due
to the lower degree of backward linkages from the high-technology sector, a
success here does not have the same positive e⁄ect as an equivalent expansion
of the manufacturing sector. The results show that this mechanism generates
substantial e⁄ects on aggregate income. Policy 1 can be said to resemble In-
dia￿ s industrial policy the most, and the results from our model is consistent
with recent experiences in India. A very pro￿table high technology service
sector is thriving whereas basic manufacturing is lagging behind.
The most important issue integral to our model pertains to the interpre-
25tation of di⁄erent sectors. The names we have attributed are somewhat mis-
leading. To recapitulate we have ￿rst the A sector, which could be thought
of as a composite of agriculture and basic services. Second, the H sector is
a high-technology sector with many forward but fewer backward linkages, in
contrast to the manufacturing M sector where backward linkages dominate.
There is no introduction of new goods in the model. In a static setting
this should pose no problem, but when we perform the policy experiments
we implicitly read in some quasi-dynamics. Speci￿cally, we say that a ￿rm
transforms from M to being a H ￿rm, or from being a A ￿rm to becoming a
M ￿rm. How can this be interpreted? Compare the pre-industrial economy
to one where the A sector make up one half and the other half is the M sector.
From such a comparison we cannot say that the latter economy di⁄ers in the
sense that new goods, e.g. automobiles, are available.
A more appropriate interpretation of the sectors is as di⁄erent functions.
The function of for instance transportation was available also in the pre-
industrial stage albeit at a much less degree of e¢ ciency than what was
later possible with the introduction of automobiles. A similar argument
can be made with regard to various sorts of food storage and preparation
which as a consequence of industrialization becomes much more e¢ cient.
The same interpretation is possible when a ￿rm transforms from M to H,
thereby performing a speci￿c function but now with, for instance, the aid
of modern computers. We can also think of outsourcing and the process
wherein ￿rms specialize on core competencies as a prototypical case where
a function is performed more e¢ ciently. However, in our model it is not an
increasing degree of specialization per se that causes increasing output, it
is the opportunity to tailor a more e¢ cient mode of production to speci￿c
functions.
Given the available empirical data, there are obvious problems with this
interpretation. In principle this is however a way of identifying the sectors
in our model.
7 Conclusions
The majority of the developed economies in the world have displayed a very
distinct pattern of industrialization with regards to sectoral shares of ag-
gregate production. Recent trends suggest that India is not following this
typical pattern of industrialization. Evidence suggest that while certain high-
technology industries are ￿ ourishing, growth in basic manufacturing is lag-
ging behind. The contribution of this paper is ￿rst to describe these trends
and to capture them in a theoretical framework where they are tied together.
26Secondly, we extend a recent model in the big-push tradition by allowing for
a partial industrialization equilibrium and choice of technology.
Under the assumption that a high-technology service sector buys interme-
diary inputs from its own sector only, it is shown that the design of industrial
policy can have a substantial e⁄ect on aggregate income. When mainly di-
rected towards the high-technology sector policy can actually cause a drop
in aggregate income. A better way is to promote general industrialization
by reducing the ￿xed costs of industrial production. However, as we have
discussed the scope for such a policy is also limited.
The model and results presented captures the static e⁄ects of one plau-
sible mechanism. With respect to the speci￿c case of India, there are other
equally important circumstances that can explain the lagging manufacturing
sector. Exports and remaining institutional barriers are two of the most ob-
vious alternative explanations. However, based on the ￿ndings in this study
we maintain that it is important to acknowledge the risk of promoting a sec-
tor which is isolated, with respect to backward linkages, from the rest of the
economy.
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